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Abstract
This paper analyses the eects of the European Union's anti-dumping taris against Chi-
nese imports on all aected rms: "the good" European import-competing rms, "the bad"
Chinese exporters and "the ugly" European importers of dumped products. The results show
that temporary import taris are benecial to the least productive "good" EU producers, but
harms the most productive "ugly" EU importers. Overall, the net eects of anti-dumping
policy on European employment and exports are largely negative. Also taris enhance the
productivity of surviving "bad" Chinese exporters and widens the productivity gap with Eu-
ropean competitors.
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1 Introduction
The "China Shock" associated with the emergence of China as the "factory of the world" and
the world's top exporter of goods has had signicant implications for economies across the globe,
especially in developed countries (WTO, 2015; Autor et al., 2016; Baldwin, 2016; Qiu and Zhan,
2016). Import competition from China and other low-wage countries has been linked to plant
closure, lower rm-level growth and negative employment and wage eects at the industry and
local labor market levels.1
China's rise as a global economic power and the resulting turmoil in developed countries'
labor markets led to a signicant shift toward protectionism, mainly through the adoption of anti-
dumping (AD) and anti-subsidy measures, which are some of the few trade defense instruments
allowed under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework (Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015).2
The use of AD measures has been on the rise, especially since the 2008 nancial crisis. As the
world's largest exporter, China has been the main target of a signicant share of these AD mea-
sures, especially from the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU). Between 1995 and
2014, of a total of 3,058 AD cases, China has been the target of 759 (almost 25% of the total),
and since 2008 China's share in AD measures has increased to around 40%.3
Although international trade policy measures such as AD duties aim to protect domestic indus-
tries, they often result in higher prices for consumers, and increase the costs of import-dependent
rms impacting their exporting capability (Irwin, 2017). In addition, these measures constrain the
ability of import-dependent rms to access cheaper or higher-quality intermediate inputs from for-
eign markets, with negative implications for their position in the global value chains of production
and for their productivity more generally (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2013; Vandenbussche and
Viegelahn, 2018).
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the eects of the EU's AD policy on Chinese imports be-
tween 1999 and 2007 and to provide a comprehensive economic analysis of its implications on the
performance of all categories of aected rms. We consider France as a representative EU country
and combine rm-level and international trade transaction-level data from France and China to
study the implications of AD measures on the total factor productivity (TFP), employment, total
exports and investment in research and development (R&D) of all aected rms. Following the
European political narrative, these include "the good" import-competing European producers fac-
ing unfair import competition, dened as French producers that belong to 4-digit manufacturing
sectors that are protected by the EU AD measures (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce,
2011); "the bad" Chinese rms that export to the EU the products targeted by the AD measures
1For a detailed overview of the literature on the eects of import competition from China, see Autor et al. (2016)
and Qiu and Zhan (2016).
2Dumping is a strategy by which rms export products at a price lower than the price usually charged in the
home market or at a price lower than the cost of production. For details on anti-dumping, please refer to Article
VI of the GATT 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement.
3See the "Statistics on anti-dumping" section of the WTO webpage (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_
e/adp_e/adp_e.htm) for details.
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and "the ugly" European import-dependent rms that we dene as the French manufacturing rms
that import from China products that were targeted by the AD measures. We identify 36 AD cases
approved by the EU and targeting Chinese imports between 1999 and 2007. These cases are linked
to almost 700 "ugly," 2,000 "good" and 2,780 "bad" rms.4 Our methodological approach is to
apply a dierence-in-dierences (DID) methodology combined with a propensity score matching
(PSM) approach to control for selection-bias issues (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce,
2011).
The availability of rich, rm-level data for French manufacturing rms allows the identica-
tion of producers and importers of protected products and the construction of various measures of
rm-level performance. Moreover, several studies have highlighted the similarities among European
rms, particularly in terms of the link between internationalization strategies and rm-level per-
formance (Ottaviano and Mayer, 2007; Rubini, 2010; Bekes et al., 2011). Hence, our contribution
is twofold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study to provide a comprehensive
micro-level analysis of the eects of the AD measures on the performance of foreign exporters, do-
mestic producers and domestic importers of the targeted products. Second, we precisely identify
import-dependent rms that rely on the import of products aected by AD duties and therefore
consider the implications of these duties on their performance.
To briey summarize our results, our ndings suggest that the EU AD policy is successful in
constraining Chinese exports to the EU, mainly through a reduction in the number of Chinese
exporters. Protected import-competing rms enjoy an improvement in productivity and employ-
ment, but these positive eects are limited to the least productive rms, mainly those that do not
export outside the European Single Market. However, the same AD measures have a negative eect
on the productivity, employment, and total exports of import-dependent rms, particularly the
most productive. These negative eects are not limited to rms that import the products directly
from China, but extend to rms that may import the products from other source countries, since
the prices of these products tend to rise in general. Although the EU AD duties lead to the exit
of some Chinese exporters, the surviving ones experience an increase in productivity, employment
and total exports. The improved performance of the surviving exporters seems to be driven by
investments in R&D, which allow exporters to improve productivity and overcome the rise in trade
costs induced by the AD measures.
The overall eect of these policies is perverse. First, we nd the general impact on the French
economy to be mixed. The imposition of the AD measures leads to a deterioration in the produc-
tivity of import-dependent rms, although it increases that of import-competing rms. However,
the costs in terms of productivity appear to be experienced mainly by highly productive import-
4Table A1 in Appendix A compares the industries protected by these cases, the rms in protected industries
and the products targeted between France and the EU. Table A1 shows that industries protected by AD duties are
very similar between France and the EU in terms of their size and economic relevance. Firms in these protected
industries are, on average, slightly larger in France but have similar labor productivity with rms in the same
industries in the EU. Finally, the shares of targeted products in total imports and imports from China are also very
similar between France and the EU. Further information on the 36 cases can be found in Table A2 in Appendix A.
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dependent rms, while the benets are captured by less productive import-competing ones. The
overall protection eect in terms of employment is negative: the larger negative impact on a few
import-dependent rms causes the loss of almost 13,000 jobs, much more than the almost 1,400
new jobs created by protected import-competing rms. Moreover, by increasing the cost of sourc-
ing inputs from China, the AD policy reduces the exports of import-dependent rms by almost
9 billion euros. If we take into account of all potential users of targeted Chinese products and
extend our calculations to the overall French economy, the net loss is of almost 81,000 jobs and
42 billion euros in terms of exports, which accounts for almost 2.2% of the overall employment in
and 13% of the overall exports from French manufacturing industries. Finally, by improving the
performance of surviving Chinese exporters, the EU AD policy leads to a perverse long-run eect
that widens the productivity gap between French rms and competing Chinese exporters.
These ndings have important economic and policy implications. First, we demonstrate the
ineciency of AD duties as an instrument of trade protection. The imposition of AD taris man-
ages to protect the "good" import-competing rms only in the short run, while the upscaling of
the surviving "bad" Chinese exporters leads to even tougher competitive pressures in the long run.
Second, amid growing concern about the protectionist abuse of these measures, governments in
developed countries should take into account the likely negative impact of AD duties on "ugly"
import-dependent rms. These rms are highly productive and fully integrated in the global value
chains of production. They import intermediate inputs from China because of their higher "value-
for-money" ratio to produce better and high-end products, generating growth in value added and
local employment.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature, especially the literatures on the im-
plications of trade defense instruments and access to imported inputs for rm-level performance.
The theoretical literature on AD predicts, in general, that AD policies are, in most cases, welfare
reducing. In terms of welfare, the gains for protected producers are more than oset by the costs in
terms of consumers welfare and loss of comparative advantage (Gallaway et al., 1999; Blonigen and
Park, 2004; Bown and Crowley, 2007; Ruhl, 2014; Wu et al., 2014). From an empirical standpoint,
several studies have shown that AD measures have a negative impact on trade volumes, due to
the eects associated with trade destruction, diversion and deection (Bown and Crowley, 2006;
Durling and Prusa, 2006; Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2010; Egger and Nelson, 2011; Besedes and
Prusa, 2017).5
Despite using dierent methods and data sources, existing micro-level empirical studies nd
similar results to our own on import-competing rms. For instance, previous rm-level analyses
have congruently shown that protection through AD measures results in an improvement in the
markup of protected rms (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2005; Pierce, 2011), consistent with the
theoretical prediction of a pro-competitive eect of trade, where trade induces greater competition
that leads to a fall in the prices and markups of domestic rms (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Chen
5For a comprehensive survey of the literature on AD, see Nelson (2006), Zanardi (2006) and Blonigen and Prusa
(2016).
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et al., 2009; Edmond et al., 2015; Arkolakis et al., 2018). In terms of productivity, Konings and
Vandenbussche (2008), using a revenue-based measure of productivity, nd a positive eect on the
productivity of protected rms. Pierce (2011) instead, measuring productivity based on physical
output and getting rid of the output price bias, provides evidence of a negative productivity eect
for U.S. rms. However, in line with our results, both studies show how the eects of AD measures
are heterogeneous across rms and tend to benet laggard import-competing rms. Similarly, in
line with our results, evidence by Lu et al. (2013) on the eect of U.S. AD duties against Chinese
products on the performance of aected Chinese exporters, show that such protectionist mea-
sures make the surviving exporters more productive. In turn, this will increase the competitive
pressures faced by protected rms in developed countries once the AD duties are lifted, sowing
doubts about the eciency of these measures to protect threatened industries. We contribute
to this literature by analyzing the combined impact of the same AD measures on the two com-
peting groups of rms, the "good" European domestic producers and the "bad" Chinese exporters.
So far, however, only few papers have considered the implications of AD measures on import-
dependent rms, which are increasingly prominent in today's world of vertical specialization and
production fragmentation across borders. Anecdotal evidence documented by Isakson (2007) and
Eckhardt (2011) shows how import-dependent rms lose from the imposition of AD duties and
often oppose their implementation.6 The reason is that access to imported inputs can enhance
the productivity of domestic rms by increasing the range of available intermediate inputs, by
improving the quality of available inputs and through learning-by-importing eects (Ethier, 1982;
Markusen, 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008).7 Moreover, access
to imports from low-cost countries can improve the competitiveness of rms by reducing production
costs and generating savings that may allow rms to expand their domestic activities (Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). In an attempt to take these rms into consideration, Konings and
Vandenbussche (2013) build a model where AD duties are imposed on intermediate goods and
show that the overall eect of these duties on the output of an importer depends on the elasticity
of demand. A higher elasticity of demand will lead to larger losses from protection. Although
Konings and Vandenbussche (2013) are unable to identify importers, they consider exporting rms
instead and assume that exporters of a product are more likely to be importers as well. They
also assume that exporters face tougher competition in international markets; therefore, compared
with domestic sales, the foreign sales of an exporting rm will be more strongly aected by protec-
tionism. Their results show that AD policies harm exporters while beneting domestic producers.
The closest paper to our study is by Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2018), who look at the
within-rm reallocation of inputs as a result of AD policy in India. Firms using products aected
6The press has also reported on the negative impact of AD duties. See for exam-
ple: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-trade.4.9181765.html. and
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-corporate/article1000942.ece.
7Several recent studies have documented substantial productivity gains from imports for developing countries,
including Indonesia (Amiti and Konings, 2007), Chile (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008), India (Topalova and Khan-
delwal, 2011), Hungary (Halpern et al., 2015), and China (Elliott et al., 2016). For instance, Goldberg et al. (2010)
show that access to imported inputs results in an increase in the product scope of Indian rms.
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by AD measures readjust their input mix and reduce the use of protected inputs. As a result,
import-dependent rms reallocate their sales away from outputs made of protected inputs and
experience a reduction in their markups. Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2018) identify users of
protected inputs but are unable to distinguish between rms that import those inputs from tar-
geted countries and those that source the protected inputs domestically or from unaected foreign
locations. By using detailed transaction-level data on imports, our paper is the rst to identify
precisely import-dependent rms. We track French rms that have imported from China the prod-
ucts aected by EU AD measures against China before and after the imposition of these measures.
In addition, we further contribute to the literature by exploring the heterogeneity of the response
of import-dependent rms to the imposition of AD measures by considering dierent categories of
"ugly" rms in several robustness tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources and presents
descriptive statistics. Section 3 details the methodology and section 4 presents and discusses the
empirical ndings and policy implications. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
For this study, we combine data from several sources. First, we rely on the Global Anti-dumping
Database (GAD), from the World Bank, to provide information on all AD proceedings carried out
by the EU against China during the period 1999 to 2007 (Bown, 2015).8 This dataset records all
the AD measures adopted in the world since 1980, and provides detailed information on product
classication at the Harmonized System (HS) 8-digit level, the dates of initiation and conclusion,
the outcomes of the investigations, the values of AD duties imposed, and the length of the mea-
sures. We aggregate the AD data to the HS 6-digit level to maintain consistency across the EU
and Chinese HS classications.9 We focus on this sample period to be consistent with the time
frame of the rm-level data and to exclude from the analysis any possible statistical disturbance
associated with the surge in trade protectionism experienced after the beginning of the global
economic crisis in 2008 (Vandenbussche and Viegelahn, 2011; Bown and Crowley, 2013). We com-
plement this dataset by collecting additional information on trade ows and aected industries
from the Eurostat database on bilateral trade in goods (COMEXT) at the HS 6-digit level and
from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics database on industry-level data, at the NACE
4-digit rev.1.1 level, for European manufacturing sectors.
In the EU, the European Commission is the institution designed to investigate AD cases ini-
tiated by European producers representing at least 25% of the output of the import-competing
8Over the period of analysis, the EU went through two enlargements, in 2004 and 2007. In our data, the EU
consists of 15 countries up to 2004, 25 countries between 2004 and 2007 and 27 countries in 2007.
9The customs data for France and China use the World Customs Organization's Harmonized System to dene
products. Since the 6-digit codes are the most detailed denitions that are used as the common standard across all
countries, we have aggregated the French and Chinese HS 8-digit classications to the HS 6-digit level for precise
identication of the same products in the French and Chinese datasets.
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EU industry. The European Commission investigation carries out inquiries of exporters in the
countries concerned, import-competing rms in the EU and import-dependent rms and users in
the EU. The European Commission may also inspect records at companies' premises to compare
and verify the data provided by all the participating parties. Although the European Commission
seeks the views of importers and users, recent evidence has shown that producer groups are more
successful in lobbying their governments toward the support of AD measures for the protection of
domestic industries, while importers, retailers, outsourcers and consumers have less political weight
in lobbying national and EU authorities.10 During the period of our analysis, the EU Council of
Member States voted, on the basis of the European Commission investigation, with simple ma-
jority for the adoption of AD measures imposed on all import ows of the aected products from
the designated countries. AD measures usually take the form of ad-valorem duties, but could also
be specic duties or price undertakings. These measures are generally imposed for ve years but
may be subject to revision if the circumstances of the exporters change, or the measures can be
extended beyond the ve-year period if the dumping strategy has not been terminated.11
China, as the largest source of imports for the EU, has become the main target of the EU
AD measures, and the EU is now the world's main initiator of AD cases against China (Cheong,
2007; Rovegno and Vandenbussche, 2012). Figure 1 shows that despite a decline in the number of
varieties, dened at the product-country level, investigated for dumping by the EU during the pe-
riod 1999 to 2007, the share of Chinese products investigated increased continuously, particularly
after China's accession to the WTO in 2001. In this study, we focus on 36 approved EU AD cases
against Chinese imports between 1999 and 2007. These cases aected 67 targeted products at the
HS 6-digit level, that are linked to 36 EU industries at the NACE 4-digit level.12
[Figure 1 about here]
At the rm level, we use detailed data for France and China to analyze the performance of
the "good," the "bad" and the "ugly." For France, we rely on two datasets: the Annual French
Business Survey (ABS), provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, and
international trade transaction-level data collected by the French Customs Agency. The French
Customs Agency provides information on the origin-destination countries of trade ows, HS 8-digit
product-level categorization and value of manufacturing imports and exports.13 The ABS dataset
provides detailed balance sheet information for all French rms with more than 20 employees,
10For a review of the political economy literature on this topic, please refer to De Bievre and Eckhardt (2011)
and Eckhardt (2011, 2013).
11The EU AD regulations have undergone several reforms. For a comprehensive review of EU AD regulations,
please refer to the Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 8th June 2016
(L 176/21).
12On average we identify four cases per year, with a minimum of one case in 1999 and a maximum of nine cases
in 2005.
13This dataset includes all intra-EU shipments greater than 100,000 euros and all shipments to countries outside
the EU over 1,000 euros, covering more than 90% of French total manufactured goods imported (Ottaviano and
Mayer, 2007).
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including total output, domestic and foreign sales, number of employees and R&D expenditure.14
Merging the exhaustive transaction-level trade dataset with the GAD dataset allows us to identify
all French rms that have imported the targeted products from China and/or other trade partners.
Specically, the French "ugly" import-dependent rms are identied as rms that have imported,
in the year before the imposition of AD measures, targeted products from China. We identify
the "good" protected import-competing rms as French rms belonging to the same NACE 4-digit
sector as products targeted by EU AD measures on Chinese imports (Konings and Vandenbussche,
2008).15
For China, we rely on the China Customs dataset provided by the China Data Center at
Tsinghua University, Beijing. This data set covers all export transactions of Chinese exporters,
including product classication at the HS 6-digit level, trade volume, trade value and export des-
tinations for the period 2000 to 2006. We identify the "bad" exporters as Chinese rms that have
exported to the EU the products targeted by EU AD duties in the year before the imposition of
AD measures. We merge the China customs data with the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
(ASIF) conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, which includes information on
rm characteristics (e.g., industry, rm name, employment and rm size) and many nancial vari-
ables from rm balance sheets, income statements and cash-ow statements (e.g., input, output,
R&D and value added).16
Figure 2 presents the distribution of import-competing, import-dependent and exporting rms
aected by AD measures across NACE 2-digit industries and the market share of the targeted
Chinese products to the EU in each of these industries.17 Import-dependent rms are evenly dis-
tributed across sectors, with the highest dependency in the textile and consumer goods industries.
French import-competing and Chinese exporters are concentrated in the same sectors, mainly in
the chemicals, machinery and equipment industries.
[Figure 2 about here]
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the performance of French import-dependent rms,
French import-competing rms and Chinese exporters. For each group of rms, we compare the
averages of the treated and (unmatched) untreated calculated over a window of up to three years
before and after the imposition of EU AD measures on Chinese products. For the sample of
14The ABS data and the international trade transaction-level data are condential data sets and available upon
requests from the relevant French statistical authorities.
15We identify protected sectors by using the correspondence tables between the HS products classication and
the SIC industrial classications provided by Pierce and Schott (2009).
16The China Customs data and the ASIF data are condential datasets and available upon requests from the
relevant Chinese statistical authorities.
17For import-dependent and import-competing industries, market share is measured as the share of imports from
China over total imports of the targeted products at the HS 6-digit level averaged at the industry level. For
exporting industries, market share is measured as the share of exports to the EU over total exports of the targeted
products at the HS 6-digit level averaged at the industry level.
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French rms, we consider as untreated all rms that have not been aected by AD protection as
import-competing or import-dependent during our time period.18 For the sample of Chinese rms,
we consider as untreated the remaining Chinese exporters within the same HS 4-digit industry as
aected exporters. For treated rms, Table 1 presents average values over a period of up to three
years before and after the imposition of EU AD measures. For unaected rms, we compare the
average values before and after the median year.
Only slightly fewer than 700 French direct importers are aected by AD measures, while almost
2,000 French producers are protected by these measures. However, import-dependent rms are on
average larger and more productive compared with the import-competing rms in our sample.
Import-dependent rms also invest more in R&D activities and are more active exporters. Table 1
shows that, after the imposition of AD measures, the number of import-dependent rms is signif-
icantly reduced. Protected import-competing rms register a steady level of employment and an
increase in exports after being protected; however, the increase in exports is weaker in comparison
with the sample of untreated producers. Table 1 also indicates a sharp decline in the number of
Chinese exporters after the introduction of EU AD measures on Chinese products. However, the
surviving Chinese exporters report an improved level of productivity, higher level of investment in
R&D activities and higher values of total exports. EU AD measures on Chinese products seem to
protect import-competing rms that are characterized by low levels of productivity, while imposing
duties on the import of Chinese products that are used by more productive import-dependent rms.
[Table 1 about here]
3 Methodology
The analysis of AD protection on rm-level outcomes is subject to two potential sources of bias:
self-selection by rms that initiate AD cases and selection by governments (or the EU in this
case) if decisions to approve AD cases are based on factors that are correlated with rm-level
outcomes (e.g., productivity, employment growth and other macroeconomic trends) (Konings and
Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce, 2011). Although import-dependent rms are invited by the European
Commission to contribute to the investigation process, arguably these sources of bias are less
relevant in the case of these rms, since they are less likely to inuence the European Commission's
decision. However, in order to rule out the possibility that the decision to protect may be based
on variables that are correlated with the dependent variables in our analysis, our approach to
assess the impact of AD measures on the performance of aected rms consists of applying a DID
approach with PSM at the rm level (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce, 2011; Lu et al.,
2013). This approach allows us to assess the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT), the
dierence in the outcome variable between rms in the treatment group, rms that have been
18More precisely, we drop from the sample all rms in NACE 4-digit industries that are associated with the
production of HS 6-digit-level products that have been targeted by EU AD duties toward countries other than
China. We also drop from our sample importers of targeted products from the targeted country(ies).
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aected by the imposition of AD measures on Chinese products (the treatment), and a control
group of similar rms that have not been treated before and after the imposition of AD measures
(Lechner, 2002; Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). The average eect that treated observations would
have experienced if they had not been aected by AD measures can be expressed as:
τATT = E
(
y1
t+n − y
0
t+n | St = 1
)
= E
(
y1
t+n | St = 1
)
− E
(
y0
t+n | St = 1
)
(1)
where τ represents the expected eect on outcome y of the AD treatment in the post-treatment
period, relative to the eect of no treatment for the same observation. The fundamental problem
is that only one of the two possible outcomes in Equation (1) is identiable, whether the observa-
tion has been treated or not, and the counterfactual for the same observation cannot be observed.
Since E
(
y0
t+n | St = 1
)
is not observable, we apply PSM to construct suitable control groups by
considering instead the eect of no treatment on similar observations that have not been aected
by AD measures, E
(
y0
t+n | St = 0
)
. The validity of the DID approach relies on the assumption
that, in the absence of treatment, the average change in outcomes (y1 − y0) would have been the
same for the treated and controls. This assumption may be too stringent if the distribution of
certain observables that are related to the dynamics of the outcome variable is unbalanced between
the treatment and control groups. In this case, a conditional identication restriction of the DID
approach is necessary, where a vector of variables that are believed to be related to the outcome
dynamics is introduced into the DID estimator (Abadie, 2005). Heckman et al. (1997) show that
combining PSM with DID is eective in eliminating selection bias and accommodating covariates
into a DID framework. The matching estimator controls for the selection bias based on observable
covariates by comparing treated rms with comparable untreated rms, while the DID approach
controls for the bias associated with unobserved heterogeneity (Imbens, 2004).
We consider several outcome variables that reect the performance of aected rms, such as
TFP, total employment, investment in R&D and total exports. We estimate TFP following the
methodology developed by De Loecker (2007), which is an extension of the standard Olley and
Pakes (1996) methodology, which takes into consideration the heterogeneity in terms of productiv-
ity between exporters and domestic rms. In the TFP estimation, we use value added as a proxy
for output, total employment as a measure for labor and total costs of intermediate input as costs
of production. We also include in the estimation a dummy for exporters and total investment in
tangible and intangible assets. Since our TFP measure is based on revenue and not on physical
output, due to increases in prices it could capture markup eects instead of changes in the e-
ciency of rms (De Loecker and Van Biesebroeck, 2018). Therefore, all monetary values in our
analysis are deated using OECD production price indexes at the 2-digit industry level, using 2000
as the baseline for France; for China Producer Price Index deators at the industry level are taken
from Yang (2015) and constructed according to Brandt et al. (2012) using 1998 as the baseline.19
The PSM technique allows us to select from the sample of untreated observations a suitable
control group for which the distribution of observables is as similar as possible to the distribution
19Once estimated and logged, we remove the top and bottom percentiles without any signicant loss of observa-
tions, following the ISGEP (2008) approach to mitigate the eect of outliers on the analysis.
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of observables for the treated group before the imposition of the AD measures (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997; Becker and Ichino, 2002). The rst step is to estimate the
probability of being aected (treated) by the introduction of AD measures Pr(AD = 1)it, the
so-called propensity score, based on a set of observable characteristics:
Pr(AD = 1)it = β0 + β1Prodit−1 + β2Indit−1 + β3Firmit−1 + ki + kt + ξit (2)
We use a logit model to estimate the propensity score of being treated and control for product-
level (Prodit−1) and industry-level (Indit−1) characteristics that have been shown in the literature
to aect the probability of AD treatment. We also add a set of rm-level variables (Firmit−1) that
ensure that the treated and control groups of rms have similar distributions of covariates that are
linked to outcome variables and associated with the likelihood of a rm being treated by AD mea-
sures. More specically, at the imported product level, we control for lagged import penetration
from China, the cumulative number of previous EU AD investigations from 1987 onward (Blonigen
and Park, 2004; Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce, 2011) and the lagged import price from
China.20 We control for the size of the industry producing the product by including the lagged
employment level of the EU industry at the NACE 4-digit level. Industry size is a proxy for the
signicance of the industry for the EU economy and EU policy makers (Blonigen and Park, 2004;
Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce, 2011). At the level of the industry of the product, we
also control for the lagged growth rate of employment and lagged level of productivity.21 A growing
industry may be perceived as faring well in the face of import competition and will perhaps be less
likely to receive protection. Finally we add the lagged GDP growth rate in the EU to account for
overall economic shocks at the EU level. At the rm level, we include lagged size measured by the
number of employees, lagged TFP, lagged value of total imports and an exporter dummy.22 Table
B1 in Appendix B presents the results of the propensity score estimation for the three categories
of rms. It shows that higher levels of import penetration from China and lower Chinese prices
are associated with a greater probability of AD measures. Negative shocks to the EU economy are
also associated with a greater probability of treatment. The experience of rms that initiate AD
cases, as proxied by the number of previous AD cases at the product level, is also positively linked
to the probability of treatment.
20We dene import penetration as the share of imports from China over total imports of the EU at the HS 6-digit
level. Import price is measured as the ratio of the value over volume of imports from China into the EU at the
HS 6-digit level. Both variables are based on the COMTRADE dataset. Previous AD investigations are calculated
using the World Bank's GAD database. All product-level variables are averaged at the level of the rm over the
set of products imported by each rm.
21Productivity at the industry level is measured as value added per employee. All product and industry variables
are extracted from the EUROSTAT Structural Business Statistics database and measured at the EU level for each
NACE 4-digit industry. These variables are averaged at the level of each importing rm across the range of NACE
4-digit industries from which each rm imports.
22We estimate three separate PSM equations, one for each type of rms. We adopt a similar set of variables at
the product, industry and rm levels to estimate the probability of treatment for the "good" import-competing
rms, the "bad" Chinese exporters and the "ugly" import-dependent rms. In the propensity score estimation
for Chinese exporters, we omit the exporter dummy, as all rms are exporters, and include an additional control
variable that measures the total value of intermediate inputs at the rm level.
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We match the "good" import-competing rms to rms within the same NACE 2-digit industry
and match the "ugly" import-dependent rms to similar importers that do not directly import any
products that have been subject to any EU AD duties at time t-1. We restrict the pool of matched
controls to rms that import products within the same HS 4-digit classication as targeted HS
6-digit products. In the case of Chinese exporters, we match these targeted exporters to Chinese
exporters of other products within the same HS 4-digit classication as the HS 6-digit targeted
products. After identifying the pool of treated and control groups, we maintain a cross-section
of the data where we observe the treated rms in the year of treatment (t=0) and each control
observation in its median year.
We match treated and control observations by applying a kernel algorithm with a strict band-
width of 0.05. We impose a common support condition and drop the treated observations whose
propensity scores are larger or smaller than the maximum or minimum of those never aected.
The kernel matching estimator associates to the outcome yit of treated rm i a matched outcome
given by a kernel-weighted average of the outcomes of comparable non-treated rms, where the
weight given to non-treated c is proportional to the closeness between i and c (Leuven and Sianesi,
2003; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). We estimate standard errors using bootstrapping, with 500
repetitions, to alleviate heteroskedasticity concerns related to additional sources of variability in-
troduced by the estimation of the propensity score and the kernel matching process (Heckman
et al., 1997; Abadie and Imbens, 2011). Tables B2, B3, and B4 in Appendix B present balancing
tests of variables used in the matching procedures and conrm the quality and validity of the
matching. More precisely, these tests indicate that for none of the variables does the absolute
standardized bias exceed the 25% threshold required for a valid matching (Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin, 1985; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The variance ratios of the treated over the non-treated
indicate a good balance for most of the covariates. For all the rm-level variables, the balancing
tests indicate that treated and controls did not signicantly dier prior to the treatment.
4 Results
Before discussing the rm-level analysis, we present a preliminary discussion on the impact of AD
measures on total trade between the EU and China at the product level. This discussion provides
an overview of the aggregate eects of AD measures on the trade ows and prices of aected prod-
ucts and sets the rm-level analysis in context. Table C1 in Appendix C presents the results of a
DID analysis at the product level for Chinese exports to the EU. It shows that AD measures are
successful in reducing China's total exports of targeted products toward the EU market. However,
this drop in exports is driven by a signicant reduction in the number of exporting rms. Further
rm-product-level analysis reveals that the surviving exporters do not experience a decrease in
exports of the aected products or a change in the (FoB) price of these products.23 Table C2
23Unreported results at the product and the rm-product levels show that after the imposition of AD measures
by the EU, total exports toward non-EU destinations increased, indicating that Chinese exporters engaged in trade
diversion as a result of the AD measures. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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in Appendix C presents an equivalent analysis at the product level from the perspective of the
EU. It explores the eects of AD measures on the price (FoB) of the imported targeted products
across several source countries: China, intra-EU and the rest of the world. Table C2 shows that
AD measures lead to an increase in the price of imported products from China and the rest of the
world. However, internal prices, within the boundaries of the Single Market, are not signicantly
aected by these measures. These ndings are consistent with the results of Prusa (1997) who
reports an increase in foreign prices, from targeted and non-targeted countries, as a consequence
of AD measures in the U.S., and the results of Liebman (2006) and Konings and Vandenbussche
(2008), who nd a limited eect of AD measures on domestic prices in the U.S. and the EU,
respectively.24
4.1 The Ugly
We map the AD measures to product-level imports at the rm level to investigate precisely the
eects of AD policy on the "ugly" import-dependent rms. Table 2 reports the results of the
DID analysis of EU AD measures for up to two years after the treatment. The main specication
is based on the sample of "direct importers," which are identied as rms importing products
targeted by EU AD measures directly from China in the year before the treatment (t-1). We also
dierentiate the eect of the AD measures depending on whether the rms continue to import
from China. We therefore split the sample of "direct importers" into two subsamples: "surviving
importers," dened as rms that import the targeted products directly from China in the year
before the treatment (t-1) and in the year of the treatment (t), and "exiting importers," dened as
the rms that import the targeted products directly from China in the year before the treatment
(t-1) but not after the treatment, as a consequence of the imposition of AD duties.
Table 2 shows that the AD measures have a negative impact on the productivity, employment
and total exports of rms importing the targeted products from China.25 These negative eects
start in the year of application of the protective measures and persist in the subsequent year. Rel-
ative to matched controls, treated importers experience a reduction of 3 to 7 percentage points in
their productivity growth in the year of treatment and the following year, and a reduction of 2 to 5
percentage points in their employment growth up to two years after the treatment. In addition, the
24Before the imposition of the AD duties, the prices of imported products from China were, on average, higher
than the prices of the same products imported from the rest of the world (209 euros and 168 euros, respectively, at
time t-1). The imposition of AD duties leads to an increase in prices from rest of the world. This may be explained
by an increased demand for imports from these countries of origin. An alterative explanation is that exporters from
non-targeted countries may increase their prices to avoid being the subject of future AD investigations. Although
rest of the world prices increase at a faster rate than Chinese prices, in comparison with the control group, these
prices remain, on average, below the prices of the same products imported from China (179 euros and 229 euros,
respectively, in t+2).
25In all results tables, the reported number of observations corresponds to the number of treated rms and
available controls. In Table 2, when we split the sample of treated between surviving and exiting importers, the
pool of available controls remains relatively similar across the two subsamples and similar to the overall sample of
controls available for the total sample of direct importers.
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worsening of importers' performance aects the growth of their total exports, which is reduced by
almost 30 percentage points in the two years following the treatment. The negative eects of the
AD duties are observed in both subsamples: rms that continue to import the product from China
(surviving importers) and those that cease importing the targeted products from China (exiting
importers). However, the eects are stronger in the case of exiting importers. While surviving im-
porters experience a reduction in productivity growth between 4 and 7 percentage points, the drop
in productivity is between 7 and 8 percentage points in the case of exiting importers. Similarly,
surviving importers suer a drop in employment growth between 2 and 4 percentage points, while
the decline is between 1.8 and 5 percentage points for importers that cease importing from China.
[Table 2 about here]
These results are consistent with the assumption that access to cheap imports from China
helps rms to generate savings that improve their productivity and competitiveness (Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008) and corroborate the ndings of Bloom et al. (2016) and Mion and
Zhu (2013) of a positive eect of oshoring to China on the productivity and skill upgrading of
European rms. However, the results suggest that imports from China are not associated with
an increase in R&D eort. We nd no dierence between treated and control rms in terms of
R&D investment. This evidence is also in line with Bloom et al. (2016), who nd that measures of
oshoring to China have no signicant impact on the patenting activities of European rms. Our
results seem also to suggest that rms that are forced to switch to alternative suppliers, in other
foreign countries or domestically, incur an increase in costs that translates into a stronger negative
impact on productivity, employment growth and international competitiveness.
We further explore the heterogeneity of the eect of the AD duties on importers by estimating
the ATTs across the productivity distribution. Table 3 presents the results where we split the
sample of import-dependent rms into four quartiles of productivity measured in t-1. The rst
quartile corresponds to the lowest productivity and the fourth quartile to the highest. Table 3
shows that the AD measures mostly aect the most productive importers. In the rst two quar-
tiles of productivity, we nd no signicant dierences between the treated rms and the matched
controls. In the third quartile of productivity, we observe negative eects of the AD measures
on TFP, employment and total exports of treated direct importers, but these eects are limited
to the year of the treatment. However, in the case of the most productive direct importers, we
nd negative and persistent eects of the AD measures over the three-year period except for R&D
investment. Given the self-selection of rms into importing (Elliott et al., 2016), the results in
Table 3 may be driven by the fact that more productive rms are more reliant on imports and,
therefore, more aected by protectionist measures.
We explore this idea by conditioning the eect of the AD measures on the dependence of im-
porters on the targeted products. To do so, we split the sample of import-dependent rms into
quartiles of import intensity at time t-1, measuring import intensity as the share of imports from
China of the targeted product over the rm's total imports. We expect rms that rely more on the
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direct imports of the product from China to be more aected by these measures. The rst quartile
corresponds to the lowest import intensity and the fourth quartile corresponds to the highest. The
results presented in Table 4 conrm our conjecture. The negative eects of the AD measures on
productivity, employment and total exports are only observed in the third and fourth quartiles and
are stronger in magnitude in the fourth quartile of import intensity. Import-dependent rms in
the rst two quartiles are not aected by the AD measures; if anything, rms in the rst quartile
seem to experience some growth in their employment, perhaps because they benet from the loss
of competitiveness experienced by rms with higher dependency on direct imports of the aected
products from China.
[Tables 3 and 4 about here]
The denition of the "ugly" as rms that import the aected products directly from China
may be too restrictive, as other rms may use the products without importing them directly and
hence could be indirectly aected by the AD measures. If the AD measures lead to an increase in
the prices of imports from other countries of origin or within the domestic market, then we would
expect importers from other origins and users of domestically procured targeted products to be
aected as well. Table C2 shows that after the imposition of the AD measures, the prices of the
targeted products increased not only from China, but also from other non-EU countries. How-
ever, the imposition of the AD measures does not seem to aect prices within the Single Market.
Therefore, we expect importers from non-EU origins to be aected by the AD measures even if
they do not necessarily import the products directly from China.
Hence, we widen the denition of import-dependent rms to include all importers of the tar-
geted products at the HS 6-digit level from outside EU countries and we compare these to rms
that procure these products only within the EU Single Market (importers from EU countries).
This distinction allows us to identify whether the eects of the AD protection vary across coun-
tries of origin, particularly within and outside the EU Single Market. Unfortunately, since the
data do not report the use of domestic inputs at the rm level, we cannot identify rms that use
the targeted products acquired from the domestic market. In addition, to capture the eects of
AD on the wider group of users of the targeted products, we assume that within an NACE 4-digit
industry, all rms use a similar set of products. We identify users as all rms within the same
NACE 4-digit industry as rms importing the targeted products directly from China (our main
denition of import-dependent rms).
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that only importers from non-EU countries are nega-
tively aected by the AD measures. Importers within the EU experience an increase in the rate of
employment growth in the two years following the imposition of the AD measures. These results
echo the ndings presented in Table 4, where rms that are less aected by the protective measures
seem to benet from the loss of performance suered by competitors that are more directly aected
by the AD measures. When we consider the eect of the AD duties on users of the targeted prod-
ucts dened at the industry 4-digit level, we nd negative eects on TFP and total exports in the
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year of the treatment. We also nd that employment and R&D investment experience negative
growth in comparison with non-aected rms. This nding seems to suggest that the increase
in the prices of Chinese targeted products and the possible reduction in the number of available
varieties resulting from the imposition of the AD measures hurts the users of the targeted products
even when they do not import the products directly, which is consistent with similar results in the
literature (Halpern et al., 2015; Vandenbussche and Viegelahn, 2018).
[Table 5 about here]
Overall the results indicate that the EU AD measures on Chinese products have negative eects
on the "ugly" import-dependent rms, particularly the most productive importers and importers
that rely intensively on the use of the targeted products, with negative externalities also for other
rms that do not import the aected products directly from China.
4.2 The Good
We turn now to the impact of the AD measures on French import-competing rms. We follow
Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) and Pierce (2011) and identify import-competing rms at the
industry level. It can be argued that the industry classication at the 4-digit level is not su-
ciently disaggregated to capture import competition at the product (HS 6-digit) level. However,
the data only provide a 4-digit industry classication and do not list the products produced by
each rm at a more disaggregated level. To test the robustness of our ndings, we rely on the
French customs data and identify import-competing rms as exporters of the targeted products
at the HS 6-digit level. The export data allow us to identify a sample of rms that produce and
export the targeted products. We distinguish between exporters to the EU Single Market, as these
rms enjoy the protection of the AD measures across all the EU countries, and rms that export
instead to destinations outside the EU, as these rms are not protected from Chinese competition
outside the Single Market.26
The results reported in Table 6 show that the EU AD measures are successful in providing
protection to import-competing rms. After an initial negative shock to TFP and employment,
protected import-competing rms enjoy an increase in productivity and employment two years
after the application of the AD measures. These improvements in productivity are translated into
enhanced international competitiveness, as signaled by the positive eect on total exports in the
second year after the treatment. Our results also show that AD protection does not signicantly
aect rms' propensity to invest in R&D, despite the opportunity given by these measures to
dedicate more resources to industrial and production re-organization while being protected. There
is a lack of consensus in the theoretical literature on how competition aects innovation. Increased
26Firms are associated with a 4-digit industry on the basis of their main activity. Therefore, exporters of targeted
products are not necessarily associated with the 4-digit industry matched to an HS 6-digit product and the two
samples of exporters are not two subsamples of the producers NACE 4-digit sample.
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product market competition may discourage innovation by reducing prots, but may also encour-
age innovation by increasing the incremental prots from investments in R&D (Aghion and Howitt,
1992; Aghion et al., 2005). The empirical literature on the eects of trade liberalization on the
innovation of import-competing rms is also inconclusive (Bloom et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016).
Looking specically at AD protection, Crowley (2006) shows that these measures could accelerate
technology adoption by domestic import-competing rms.
[Table 6 about here]
The implications of the AD measures on the productivity and employment of import-competing
rms are robust to the denition of import-competing rms as exporters of the targeted products
to destinations within the EU. Exporters to destinations outside the EU continue to face interna-
tional competition outside the Single Market and therefore do not fully enjoy the benets of AD
protection. Although exporters may not be representative of all import-competing rms, given
the self-selection of the largest and most productive rms into exporting (Melitz, 2003; Ottaviano
and Mayer, 2007), the consistency of the ndings across both samples suggests that we are able
to capture the eects of AD protection on import-competing rms. In addition, our ndings are
generally consistent with the results of Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) for European rms.
In Table C3 in Appendix C, we explore the heterogeneity of the impact of AD measures across
the productivity distribution of import-competing rms (dened as rms within the same NACE
4-digit industry as a treated product). We split the sample of import-competing rms into four
quartiles of TFP, measured in t-1, and nd that protectionist measures benet only the least
productive rms (in the rst quartile). These rms experience positive growth in productivity and
employment compared with matched controls after the imposition of the AD measures. In the
second and third quartiles of TFP, we observe limited dierences between the treated and control
rms. However, for the most productive rms (fourth quartile), we nd that reduced import
competition resulting from the AD measures leads to a negative eect on protected producers in
terms of productivity, employment and total exports. These results corroborate the ndings of
Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) and are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Lileeva
and Treer (2010), where low-productivity rms engage in productivity-improving investments and
experience an increase in productivity as a result of an increase in the size of the market. In the
context of AD measures, trade protection, by reducing import competition, results in an increase
in the market size of domestic rms, which benets the least productive rms, which otherwise
may not survive. As previously discussed, our measure of productivity is based on revenue and
not physical output. As highlighted by De Loecker and Van Biesebroeck (2018), revenue-based
measures of productivity may capture markup eects instead of changes in the eciency of the
rm. However, as indicated in Table C2, internal prices within the Single Market do not increase
as a result of the AD measures. Therefore, we can consider that the eects of the AD measures
on TFP capture changes in the eciency of import-competing rms.27
27Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) provide an extensive discussion of this issue and conclude that the estimated
eects of AD measures on productivity are unlikely to be driven by price eects.
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4.3 The Bad
Finally, we explore the implications for the "bad" Chinese exporters after the imposition of the AD
measures by the EU. First, we identify treated exporters as rms that exported targeted products
to the EU in the year before the treatment. Second, we also dierentiate between surviving and
exiting exporters. Surviving exporters are Chinese rms that exported the targeted products to
the EU in the year before and the year of the treatment; exiting rms are instead Chinese exporters
of the targeted products to the EU in the year before the treatment but not afterward. We match
treated to untreated exporters within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS
6-digit-level products.
Table 7 shows that the impact of EU AD duties on Chinese exporters is generally positive. The
imposition of the AD measures by the EU results in an increase in TFP, employment and total
exports over a period spanning two years after the treatment. The imposition of the AD treat-
ment corresponds to an increase in trade cost, and these measures are expected to increase the
cuto productivity above which rms can export to the EU Single Market (Melitz, 2003). Chinese
exporters seem to respond to these protectionist measures by investing in R&D for the purpose of
enhancing their productivity and improving their international competitiveness. Investing in R&D
may also be a means to avoid the product-specic restrictions imposed by the EU, as suggested
by Kaz et al. (2016).
[Table 7 about here]
The improvements in terms of R&D and total exports are mainly driven by surviving exporters.
Moreover, the eects of the AD measures on productivity are also larger in the case of surviving
exporters. These results suggest that some rms react to the AD measures by investing in pro-
ductivity enhancement measures and, as a result, are able to expand in terms of employment and
exports, while other rms that are faced with an increase in the costs of exporting react by exiting
the EU market. We further explore the heterogenous response of Chinese exporters to the AD
measures by splitting the sample into four quartiles of TFP, measured in t-1.The results, in Table
C4 in Appendix C, show that the positive eects on productivity, employment and total exports
are driven especially by the most productive Chinese exporters, which are more likely to survive
after the imposition of the AD duties. This heterogeneous response of rms to changes in trade
costs has been highlighted by the theoretical literature on trade liberalization and productivity
(Lileeva and Treer, 2010; Bustos, 2011). The EU AD measures seem to push the surviving Chi-
nese exporters to rethink and improve their production and exporting behavior, with an industrial
reallocation of resources from small to larger and more productive exporters and also within rms
from low-skilled to more capital and skill-intensive activities. Our ndings reect the results of Lu
et al. (2013), who nd that more productive Chinese exporters had a lower probability of exiting
the U.S. market after the imposition of AD duties and that surviving exporters tend to become
larger and more productive as a consequence.
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4.4 Robustness Checks
We test the robustness of our main ndings by performing several checks and estimating alter-
native specications. We test alternative matching techniques and apply a one-to-one matching
based on the same propensity score estimation presented in Table B1. We also test an alternative
estimation of the propensity score based on a panel data logit estimator with xed eects on the
panel structure of the data. After estimating the propensity score, we maintain a cross section of
the data, where treated rms are observed in the year of the treatment and controls are observed
in the median year, and apply kernel matching on the basis of this propensity score estimation.
Tables C5, C6, and C7 in Appendix C present the results of these robustness checks for the main
specications of import-dependent, import-competing and Chinese exporting rms. The tables
show that our main ndings are robust to the method of matching and to controlling for rm-level
xed eects at the propensity score level.28
In our main specications, we consider as treated rms those that directly import, produce, or
export from China to the EU the targeted products in the year prior to the imposition of the AD
measures. We test the robustness of our ndings to a more stringent denition of being treated.
Thus, we dene treated import-dependent, import-competing (at the NACE 4-digit level), and
Chinese exporters as those rms that have imported, produced and exported the targeted prod-
ucts for at least three consecutive years before the treatment. The results presented in Table C8
are consistent with our main ndings.
We also try to split the sample of exiting importers into two subsamples: rms that continue
to import the input from a dierent country, and rms that stop importing the product. However,
the number of treated rms in each of these subsamples is not large enough to draw meaningful
conclusions, but the results are overall consistent.
4.5 Aggregate Eects of the Anti-Dumping Policy
Unfortunately, a comprehensive welfare analysis of the EU AD policy on Chinese imports is beyond
the scope of this paper for various reasons. First, although we consider the eects of the AD duties
on both users and producers of the targeted products, we only focus on four rm-level outcomes:
productivity, employment, R&D investment and total exports. Second, we do not consider the
implications on upstream and downstream related industries. Finally, we do not estimate a struc-
tural model of the welfare eects on the economy through prices and wages. Instead, our analysis
uses data from France and while we consider it a representative case study, a formal welfare anal-
ysis at the EU level would require access to detailed rm-level data from various EU countries.
However, despite these limitations, in this section we present back-of-the-envelope calculations of
the aggregate eects in terms of employment and total exports for the dierent groups of aected
French rms in our sample. From the calculations at the rm level, we estimate the overall impact
28The results of the propensity score based on the xed eects logit estimation and balancing tests for all the
robustness check estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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at the industry level for France and, assuming that the rms in our data are representative of Eu-
ropean rms, we also provide some estimates of the impact for aected industries at the EU level.29
As indicated in Tables 2 and 6, AD duties have opposite eects on import-competing and
import-dependent rms. The results from our main denition of import-competing rms (rst
panel in Table 6) indicate that after an initial negative impact on the growth of employment and
total exports, AD protection leads to a higher growth rate two years after the application of the
AD duties. These eects translate into the creation of almost 1,400 jobs and an increase in total
exports of almost 7.8 billion euros. Looking at the sample of French exporters of the targeted
products within the Single Market (second panel in Table 6), we nd that these producers create
approximately between 20,000 and 24,000 jobs in the year of treatment and the year after. These
producers also expand their exports by almost 15 billion euros.
If we compare these approximative eects with the losses incurred by the direct importers of
the targeted Chinese products (rst panel of Table 2), we nd that these rms lose almost 13,000
jobs and 9 billion euros in terms of exports as a consequence of the AD duties. If we extend our
denition of import-dependent rms to include importers from non-EU countries (second panel of
Table 5), we nd that this wider group of importers experiences a loss of approximately 20,000 to
25,000 jobs in the two years after treatment and a decline in total exports of almost 24 billion euros.
The net eects in terms of employment and total exports depend on which groups of import-
competing and import-dependent rms we compare, but overall these tend to be negative. If we
compare our main samples of import-competing (producers NACE 4-digit) and import-dependent
rms (direct importers) we nd a negative net eect of almost 12,000 jobs and approximately 1.2
billion euros in terms of exports. If we compare the sample of exporters to the EU with the wider
sample of importers from non-EU countries, we nd that the jobs created by EU exporters due to
AD protection are cancelled out by job losses by importers of the targeted products and a net loss
of approximately 9 billion euros in terms of exports.
Our sample of producers represents 62% of the total employment in these French 4-digit sec-
tors, while our sample of users at the industry level (users NACE 4-digit) represents 12% of the
overall employment of these 4-digit sectors in France.30 Assuming that the ATTs that we esti-
mate for these samples are generalizable across the sectors of import-competing rms and users,
we estimate a gain of almost 2,200 jobs in French import-competing sectors and a loss of almost
83,000 jobs in sectors that rely on targeted imports in their production process. The net eect in
terms of employment corresponds to 2.2% of the overall employment in manufacturing industries
in France. In terms of exports, we estimate a gain of approximately 12 billion euros by French
import-competing sectors that is more than oset by a loss of almost 54 billion euros in sectors
29Details of these calculations are available in Appendix D.
30The estimated total employment, at t-1, in our sample of producers is 324,342.88, and the overall employment
in these 4-digit sectors in France is 523,316.16. The estimated total employment, at t-1, in our sample of users at the
NACE 4-digit level is 384,404.28, and the overall level of employment in France for these industries is 3,135,124.55.
Data on overall employment in French industries is from the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics database.
19
where rms are users of the targeted Chinese products. The net loss in terms of exports represents
almost 13% of the total exports of manufacturing industries in France.
If we were to extend these calculations to the whole of the EU and assume that the ATTs esti-
mated in our sample are a good approximation of the eects on similar import-competing and user
sectors across the EU, we nd that the AD policy leads to the creation of almost 21,000 jobs and
an increase in exports of approximately 44 billion euros in EU import-competing sectors and a loss
of approximately 688,000 jobs and 160 billion euros of exports in EU sectors where rms are users
of targeted products. The net losses in terms of employment and exports represent, respectively,
2.26% and 13.27% of total employment and total exports in manufacturing industries in the EU. 31
These estimations, particularly at the level of France and the EU, should be considered as
broad approximations of the aggregate eects, since they rely on the assumption that rms in our
samples of producers and users capture the behavior of rms in the same sectors across France
and the EU. The sample of users is dened as the sample of rms in the same 4-digit industry as
direct importers from China. Therefore, this sample excludes rms that import from other source
countries and rms in the same sectors as indirect importers. However, as indicated in Table 5,
indirect importers, particularly from non-EU sources, experience negative outcomes that are not
captured by our calculations of aggregate eects at the level of France and the EU.
5 Conclusions
Using French and Chinese rm-level and international trade transaction-level data, this paper an-
alyzes the comprehensive eects of the European Union's anti-dumping measures against Chinese
products on the performance of all categories of aected rms, the "good" European import-
competing rms, the "bad" Chinese exporters and with a particular focus on the "ugly" European
import-dependent rms.
Using a dierence-in-dierences methodology combined with propensity score matching, we
nd that the European Union's anti-dumping measures hurt the productivity, employment and
international competitiveness of the "ugly" import-dependent rms. These eects are stronger
for rms that import the products directly from China, but importers from other countries out-
side the European Single Market are also negatively aected. We also nd that the eects of the
anti-dumping duties are heterogeneous across rms and depend on the productivity of the import-
dependent rms and the signicance of the targeted products in the total imports of these rms.
The negative eects of the anti-dumping measures are concentrated among the most productive
import-dependent rms and rms that rely most signicantly on the direct imports of the targeted
31According to the Eurostat Structural Business Statistics database, total employment in French manufacturing
industry was, on average, 3,664,889 over the period 1999 to 2007. In the EU this gure was 29,512,934 on average over
the same period. For total exports, over the period 1999 to 2007, in France the average value was 308,810,579,968,
and in the EU the average value was 869,993,545,728.
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products.
Our paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the anti-dumping trade-defense instrument
by also considering the impacts on the performance of the "good" import-competing rms and
the "bad" Chinese exporters. Our ndings show that anti-dumping protection can provide some
benets to import-competing rms; however, these eects are conned to the least productive
rms and to rms that are active within the limits of the Single Market. Import-competing rms
facing international competition on export markets outside the European Union do not experience
any improvements in performance after the implementation of anti-dumping protection. We also
nd that anti-dumping measures on Chinese products have positive eects on the performance of
the surviving Chinese exporters. Targeted Chinese exporters present a heterogeneous response to
these measures. On the one hand, some exporters increase R&D investment as a reaction to these
measures and, as a consequence, survive and experience improvement in productivity, employment
growth and international competitiveness. On the other hand, some rms fail to invest in R&D
activity and, as a result of the higher trade costs induced by the anti-dumping measures, exit the
European Union market.
The general impact of the anti-dumping measures on the French economy is mixed. The overall
protection eect in terms of employment is negative. The net eect on employment for import-
competing and import-dependent rms in our sample is a loss of almost 12,000 jobs. Moreover,
anti-dumping duties result in a net loss of approximately 1.2 billion euros of exports for import-
competing and import-dependent rms in our sample. On the contrary, the EU AD measures
seem to improve the performance of targeted Chinese exporters. These eects lead to a perverse
long-run eect, which widens the productivity gap between French rms and their international
competitors in China.
These ndings highlight the ineciency of anti-dumping duties as a trade defense instrument.
The temporary protection oered to the "good" import-competing rms translates into minimal
gains in terms of productivity, employment and total exports that are limited to the least produc-
tive producers. These gains are largely oset by the damage caused by the anti-dumping policy
to import-competing rms, mostly the most productive. While the imposition of anti-dumping
measures succeed in limiting exports by Chinese rms to the European Union, it results in an im-
proved productivity and competitiveness of the surviving exporters leading to tougher competitive
pressure in the long run.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: EU AD Investigations toward China and the Rest of the World (1999-2007)
Note: Elaboration based on the World Bank Global Anti-dumping Database for the period 1999 to 2007 considering all AD investigations
launched by the EU against third-country products. The left-hand side axis presents the number of varieties, measured at the product
(HS 6-digit level)-country level, investigated by the EU per year. The right-hand side axis measures the share of Chinese products
investigated by the EU over the total number of EU AD investigations against third-country imports.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Import-Competing, Import-Dependent and Chinese Exporting Firms and Import Share of Tar-
geted Products
Note: Elaboration based on the Annual Business Survey, the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and the Customs Agency database over the period 1999 to 2007.
The graph shows the share of each category of rms aected by AD measures over the total number of rms in each manufacturing industry at the NACE 2-digit level.
For French industries, market share is measured as the share of imports from China over total imports of the targeted products at the HS 6-digit level averaged at the
industry level, while for Chinese industries, market share is measured as the share of exports to the EU over total exports.
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Table 1: Comparative Statistics between Treated and Untreated Firms
French Import-Dependent Firms
Before After
Treated Untreated t-test Treated Untreated t-test
TFP 4.905 4.336 3.899 4.873 4.345 3.021
Employment 4.894 4.565 3.776 4.971 4.653 3.098
R&D 1.869 1.192 4.379 1.923 1.283 3.431
Total Exports 8.266 6.778 7.551 8.301 6.917 6.682
No. Firms 686 7,608 485 9,131
French Import-Competing Firms
Before After
Treated Untreated t-test Treated Untreated t-test
TFP 4.19 4.027 7.864 4.179 4.040 6.762
Employment 4.436 4.395 3.233 4.521 4.466 4.368
R&D 1.295 0.851 10.257 1.242 0.868 8.571
Total Exports 6.051 4.607 9.551 6.183 4.707 9.966
No. Firms 2,063 10,728 2,029 17,145
Chinese Exporters
Before After
Treated Untreated t-test Treated Untreated t-test
TFP 6.489 6.266 16.814 6.888 6.614 15.343
Employment 6.026 5.778 24.068 6.000 5.593 27.953
R&D 1.257 1.259 -0.066 1.742 1.772 -0.077
Total Exports 14.136 13.227 56.536 14.438 13.505 41.207
No.Firms 5,710 3,205 2,781 2,826
Note: Statistics based on the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms for the period 2000 to 2006 and the
Annual French Business Survey for the period 1999 to 2007. Exporters are identied as Chinese rms that
have exported products to the EU targeted by AD measures at the HS 6-digit level according to the China
Customs dataset. Producers are dened as all the French rms belonging to the sectors protected by EU AD
measures on Chinese products at the NACE 4-digit level. Importers are identied as all French rms that
have imported targeted products from China according to the transaction-level Customs Agency dataset
at the HS 6-digit level. The table presents summary statistics, in the three-year periods before and after
the imposition of the EU AD measures, on the average log of total employment, average rm productivity
estimated as the log of TFP following the De Loecker (2007) approach, average log of total investment in
R&D activities, average log of total exports and the number of treated and untreated rms in each category.
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Table 2: Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Dependent Firms
Direct Importers Surviving Importers Exiting Importers
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.071*** -0.035** -0.038 -0.073** -0.044* -0.042 -0.069** -0.081* -0.037
b.s.e. (0.026) (0.015) (0.046) (0.031) (0.026) (0.053) (0.027) (0.046) (0.033)
Total Employment
ATT -0.021* -0.052*** -0.048* -0.024* -0.045** -0.040 -0.018 -0.050** 0.001
b.s.e. (0.013) (0.019) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021) (0.031) (0.014) (0.021) (0.037)
R&D Investment
ATT -0.200 -0.074 -0.047 -0.095 -0.111 0.018 -0.303 -0.020 0.150
b.s.e. (0.145) (0.162) (0.226) (0.172) (0.193) (0.270) (0.160) (0.179) (0.270)
Total Exports
ATT -0.298*** -0.301** -0.075 -0.267** -0.272* 0.243 -0.367*** -0.308** -0.221
b.s.e. (0.118) (0.138) (0.188) (0.132) (0.153) (0.184) (0.129) (0.149) (0.247)
No. Obs. 8,175 8,141 7,370 7,840 7,823 7,236 7,385 7,363 6,755
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated
using a DID technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time
employees, R&D investment and exports value. The sample Direct Importers includes import-dependent rms importing directly from China the
products targeted by EU AD measures in (t − 1). The sample Surviving Importers includes rms that import the targeted products directly from
China in (t− 1) and in the year of the treatment (t). The sample Exiting Importers includes rms that import the targeted products directly from
China in (t − 1) but not after the treatment. We match the treated import-dependent rms to similar importers that do not directly import any
products that have been subject to any other EU AD measure in (t − 1) and we restrict the pool of controls to rms that import products within
the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
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Table 3: Heterogeneity of the Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Dependent Firms: Analysis by Quartiles of TFP
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.027 -0.017 -0.021 -0.017 -0.025 0.022 -0.084* -0.080 -0.028 -0.435*** -0.402*** -0.401***
b.s.e. (0.048) (0.052) (0.083) (0.049) (0.062) (0.101) (0.051) (0.058) (0.089) (0.060) (0.068) (0.099)
Total Employment
ATT -0.0035 -0.032 -0.049 0.055* 0.055 -0.005 -0.050** -0.051 -0.025 -0.059** -0.066* 0.040
b.s.e. (0.025) (0.039) (0.064) (0.032) (0.039) (0.073) (0.029) (0.039) (0.047) (0.027) (0.037) (0.058)
R&D Investment
ATT -0.158 -0.083 -0.663 -0.536 -0.308 -0.031 -0.384 -0.214 0.149 -0.004 -0.302 0.087
b.s.e. (0.285) (0.318) (0.451) (0.332) (0.351) (0.464) (0.343) (0.383) (0.459) (0.232) (0.274) (0.388)
Total Exports
ATT -0.365 -0.335 -0.170 -0.141 -0.215 -0.119 -0.448** -0.349 0.210 -0.721*** -1.229*** -1.070***
b.s.e. (0.232) (0.277) (0.444) (0.275) (0.294) (0.405) (0.220) (0.253) (0.348) (0.257) (0.314) (0.401)
No. Obs. 2,169 2,165 1,962 2,067 2,055 1,879 1,964 1,796 1,967 1,862 1,847 1,631
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID
technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports
value. The sample includes import-dependent rms importing directly from China the products targeted by EU AD measures in (t − 1) and is divided into
quartiles according to TFP distribution, in (t − 1), within each NACE 2-digit industry. We match the treated import-dependent rms to similar importers that
do not directly import any products that have been subject to any other EU AD measure in (t− 1) according to their TFP distribution within each NACE 2-digit
industry, and we restrict the pool of controls to rms that import products within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity of the Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Dependent Firms: Analysis by Quartiles of Import
Share
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.038 0.005 0.045 0.068 0.111* 0.088 0.003 -0.042 0.063 -0.116** -0.077* -0.139*
b.s.e. (0.095) (0.114) (0.145) (0.053) (0.066) (0.090) (0.055) (0.065) (0.103) (0.049) (0.036) (0.077)
Total Employment
ATT 0.154*** 0.132** 0.273*** -0.019 -0.031 -0.065 -0.023 -0.049** -0.075** -0.029 -0.116*** -0.115**
b.s.e. (0.049) (0.068) (0.099) (0.027) (0.035) (0.061) (0.024) (0.024) (0.034) (0.029) (0.042) (0.045)
R&D Investment
ATT 0.620 -0.170 0.471 -0.289 -0.453 -1.178*** 0.308 0.235 -0.666 -0.483* -0.136 0.370
b.s.e. (0.426) (0.483) (0.685) (0.286) (0.309) (0.301) (0.324) (0.326) (0.543) (0.278) (0.325) (0.465)
Total Exports
ATT -0.565 -0.084 -0.169 -0.194 0.064 0.274 -0.458** -0.534** 0.638 -0.308* -0.479** -0.196
b.s.e. (0.594) (0.623) (0.785) (0.263) (0.311) (0.309) (0.217) (0.263) (0.400) (0.183) (0.212) (0.333)
No. Obs. 2,396 2,387 2,168 2,155 2,148 1,944 2,238 2,230 2,025 1,386 1,376 1,233
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID technique
with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. The sample includes
import-dependent rms importing directly from China the products targeted by EU AD measures in (t − 1) and is divided into quartiles of import intensity in (t − 1),
measured as the share of imports from China of the targeted products over the total imports of the rm. We match the treated import-dependent rms to similar im-
porters that do not directly import any products that have been subject to any other EU AD measure in (t− 1), according to import intensity measured as total imports
over total sales and we restrict the pool of controls to rms that import products within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
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Table 5: Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Dependent Firms: Alternative Denitions
Importers from EU Importers from non-EU Users NACE 4-digit
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.024 -0.043 -0.033 -0.045* -0.057* -0.009 -0.039*** -0.010 0.015
b.s.e. (0.029) (0.029) (0.039) (0.025) (0.036) (0.043) (0.015) (0.017) (0.026)
Total Employment
ATT 0.009 0.040** 0.073*** -0.022 -0.042* -0.068** -0.026*** -0.022** -0.016
b.s.e. (0.012) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.030) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019)
R&D Investment
ATT -0.232* -0.172 -0.146 0.101 0.287** 0.235 -0.177*** -0.158** -0.074
b.s.e. (0.122) (0.140) (0.187) (0.123) (0.137) (0.158) (0.064) (0.074) (0.121)
Total Exports
ATT -0.141 -0.074 0.046 -0.294* -0.453** -0.185 -0.193** 0.017 0.089
b.s.e. (0.102) (0.116) (0.150) (0.164) (0.195) (0.234) (0.076) (0.089) (0.149)
No. Obs. 3,742 3,667 2,910 3,362 3,316 2,867 19,044 17,396 12,015
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID
technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t− 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. The
sample Importers from EU includes import-dependent rms importing the targeted products at the HS 6-digit-level only from within the EU in (t − 1). The sample
Importers from non-EU includes import-dependent rms importing the targeted products at the HS 6-digit-level from outside the EU in (t − 1). The sample Users
NACE 4-digit includes all rms within the same 4-digit industries as direct importers. We match the treated importers from the EU to similar importers only from
within the EU that do not directly import any products that have been subject to any other EU AD measure in (t−1) and we restrict the pool of controls to rms that
import products within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products. Similarly, we match the treated importers from outside the
EU to similar importers from outside the EU that do not directly import any products that have been subject to any other EU AD measure in (t − 1) and we restrict
the pool of controls to rms that import products within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products. Finally, we match rms
included in the sample Users NACE 4-digit only with similar rms operating in other NACE 4-digit industries included within the same NACE 2-digit industries.
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Table 6: Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Competing Firms
Producers NACE 4-digit Exporters to EU Exporters to non-EU
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.040** 0.006 0.076** 0.006 0.098 0.021 -0.061** -0.007 0.048
b.s.e. (0.019) (0.022) (0.034) (0.072) (0.083) (0.091) (0.026) (0.031) (0.047)
Total Employment
ATT -0.025** -0.025* 0.004** 0.112*** 0.097** 0.078 0.013 0.009 0.025
b.s.e. (0.010) (0.014) (0.002) (0.038) (0.048) (0.060) (0.013) (0.018) (0.031)
R&D Investment
ATT 0.012 -0.066 -0.061 -0.288 -0.701** -0.703 0.113 -0.190 -0.178
b.s.e. (0.087) (0.095) (0.159) (0.364) (0.326) (0.479) (0.135) (0.150) (0.235)
Total Exports
ATT -0.129 -0.019 0.249** 0.115 0.121 0.890*** 0.050 -0.003 0.045
b.s.e. (0.103) (0.180) (0.122) (0.284) (0.345) (0.223) (0.123) (0.146) (0.341)
No. Obs. 14,939 14,747 12,032 10,610 10,579 9,601 10,746 10,705 9,659
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID technique
with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. The sample
Producers NACE 4 includes all rms in NACE 4-digit industries to which the targeted products protected by EU AD measures have been matched using the Pierce
and Schott (2009) concordance table between HS and SIC codes. We match treated rms included in this sample to similar rms operating in other NACE 4-digit
industries included within the same NACE 2-digit industries and that have not been protected by any other EU AD measure. The sample Exporters to EU includes
all French rms that have exported the targeted products, at the HS 6-digit level at time (t−1), only toward other EU countries. We match treated rms included in
this sample to similar rms exporting, only within the EU Single Market, products within the same HS 4-digit classication as the aected HS 6-digit-level products
and that have not been aected by other EU AD measures. The sample Exporters to non-EU includes all French rms that have exported the targeted products
at the HS 6-digit level at time (t− 1) outside the EU Single Market. We match treated rms included in this sample with similar rms exporting, outside of the EU
Single Market, products within the same HS 4-digit classication as the aected HS 6-digit products and that have not been aected by other EU AD measures.
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Table 7: Impact of EU AD Measures on Chinese Exporters
Exporters Surviving Exporters Exiting Exporters
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT 0.220*** 0.385*** 0.291** 0.150*** 0.334*** 0.193 0.235*** -0.188 0.286**
b.s.e. (0.042) (0.069) (0.134) (0.053) (0.082) (0.135) (0.057) (0.383) (0.123)
Total Employment
ATT 0.244*** 0.403*** 0.453*** 0.177*** 0.296*** 0.348*** 0.141*** 0.041 0.784***
b.s.e. (0.038) (0.056) (0.072) (0.043) (0.061) (0.073) (0.052) (0.250) (0.089)
R&D Investment
ATT 0.196*** 0.430*** -0.008 0.142** 0.300* -0.050 0.079 0.623 -0.622***
b.s.e. (0.071) (0.145) (0.174) (0.072) (0.162) (0.185) (0.135) (0.918) (0.209)
Total Exports
ATT 0.658*** 0.988*** 1.066*** 0.493*** 0.735*** 0.811*** 0.462*** 0.571 -0.945***
b.s.e. (0.071) (0.116) (0.121) (0.079) (0.134) (0.121) (0.087) (0.372) (0.185)
No. Obs. 30,663 30,663 30,663 13,906 13,906 13,906 16,295 16,295 16,295
Note: The estimations are based on the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and the Chinese Customs Data between 2000 and 2006. The ATT eect is estimated using
a DID technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. The sample
Exporters includes all Chinese rms exporting to the EU the products targeted by EU AD measures in (t − 1). The sample Surviving Exporters includes rms that export
to the EU the targeted products in (t − 1) and in the year of the treatment (t). The sample Exiting Exporters includes Chinese rms that export to the EU the targeted
products in the year before the treatment (t − 1) but not after the treatment. We match the treated exporting rms to similar exporters within the same HS 4-digit-level
classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
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A EU Anti-Dumping Cases against China
Table A1: Comparison between France and the EU
Signicance of AD Protected Industries
France Europe
Mean SD Mean SD
Av. Share Employment 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.007
Av. Share Firms 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.007
Av. Share Production 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.009
Av. Share Turnover 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
Characteristics of Firms in Protected Industries
France Europe
Mean SD Mean SD
Av. Size 50.63 32.26 39.83 26.37
Av. Labor Productivity 0.28 0.15 0.24 0.17
Av. Turnover 16.66 17.99 12.38 16.03
Av. Production 14.93 15.84 11.56 15.01
Relevance of Targeted Products
France Europe
Mean SD Mean SD
Sh. Total Imports 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004
Sh. Total Imports from China 0.0007 0.0015 0.0007 0.0013
Note: The data are from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics and COMEXT dataset over
the period 1999 to 2007. The rst part of the table presents the shares of AD protected
industries (4-digit level) in total employment, number of rms, production and turnover of
manufacturing industries in France and the EU. The second part of the table presents the
characteristics of rms in AD protected industries: size is measured as the number of full-
time employees, labor productivity is measured as turnover per employee and turnover and
production are measured in millions of euros. The last part of the table presents the share of
imported targeted products from China in the total imports and total imports from China of
France and the EU.
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Table A2: List of Approved EU AD Cases against China Included in the Analysis (1999-2007).
No. CASE GAD ID EU OJ Ref. PRODUCT No. HS6 INITIATION FINAL REVOKE HS6 NACE SHARE SHARE
DECISION TOT PRODUCT TOT IMPORT
1 EUN-AD-413 1999-L217-1 Steel Wire Rope 1 05/20/1998 08/12/1999 731210 2874 2.97% 0.0012%
2 EUN-AD-443 2000-L202-21 Non-Alloy Steel Hot Rolled Flat Products 2 05/13/1999 08/09/2000 08/06/2005 720851 2710 4.68% 0.0057%
3 EUN-AD-449 2000-L208-8 Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings 1 05/29/1999 08/11/2000 08/06/2005 730719 2751 8.01% 0.0011%
4 EUN-AD-473 2000-L316-30 Coke of Coal in Pieces 1 09/16/1999 12/14/2000 12/15/2005 270400 2310 22.35% 0.0146%
5 EUN-AD-476 2000-L301-42 Certain Electronic Weighing Scales 1 09/16/1999 11/30/2000 10/29/2005 842381 3320 9.30% 0.0006%
6 EUN-AD-493 2001-L134-67 Aluminium Foil 1 02/18/2000 05/17/2001 05/12/2006 760711 2742 2.16% 0.0009%
7 EUN-AD-505 2001-L195-8 Integrated Electronic Compact Fluorescent Lamps 1 05/17/2000 07/19/2001 10/10/2008 853931 3150 14.81% 0.0055%
8 EUN-AD-520 2002-L35-1 Ferro Molybdenum 1 11/09/2000 02/06/2002 01/21/2008 720270 2710 4.65% 0.0018%
9 EUN-AD-523 2002-L62-7 Certain Zinc Oxides 1 12/20/2000 03/05/2002 03/01/2007 281700 2412 6.91% 0.0006%
10 EUN-AD-538 2002-L196-11 Sulphanilic Acid 1 07/06/2001 07/25/2002 292142 2414 13.28% 0.0003%
11 EUN-AD-554 2003-L234-1 Para-Cresol 1 06/27/2002 09/20/2003 10/15/2008 290712 2414 5.98% 0.0002%
12 EUN-AD-561 2003-L283-1 Furfuryl Alcohol 1 08/09/2002 10/31/2003 12/10/2011 293213 2413 7.66% 0.0002%
13 EUN-AD-568 2004-L72-1 Sodium Cyclamate 1 12/19/2002 03/11/2004 292990 2466 10.62% 0.0002%
14 EUN-AD-572 2004-L271-1 Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) 1 05/22/2003 08/19/2004 390760 2416 1.74% 0.0012%
15 EUN-AD-574 2004-L336-4 OkoumÃ© Plywood 1 08/19/2003 11/12/2004 441213 2020 4.19% 0.0007%
16 EUN-AD-576 2005-L71-1 Polyester Staple Fibres 1 12/19/2003 03/17/2005 550320 2470 1.43% 0.0004%
17 EUN-AD-582 2005-L189-1 Hand Pallet Trucks and Their Essential Parts 2 04/29/2004 07/21/2005 842790 2922 12.51% 0.0011%
18 EUN-AD-583 2005-L189-15 Barium Carbonate 1 04/30/2004 07/21/2005 283660 2413 44.02% 0.0005%
19 EUN-AD-584 2005-L199-1 Certain Castings 1 04/30/2004 07/29/2005 09/02/2011 732510 2751 15.87% 0.0056%
20 EUN-AD-589 2005-L240-1 Certain Finished Polyester Filament Apparel Fabrics 5 06/17/2004 09/16/2005 09/15/2010 540761 1725 12.27% 0.0031%
21 EUN-AD-590 2005-L261-1 Trichloroisocyanuric Acid (TCCA) 2 07/10/2004 07/10/2005 293369 2414 12.85% 0.0015%
22 EUN-AD-591 2005-L267-1 Certain Magnesia Bricks 5 07/13/2004 12/10/2005 06/25/2011 681591 2626 7.22% 0.0002%
23 EUN-AD-594 2005-L302-1 Stainless Steel Fasteners and Parts Thereof 4 08/24/2004 11/19/2005 731815 2874 5.62% 0.0058%
24 EUN-AD-601 2005-L320-1 Granular Polytetrauoroethylene (PTFE) Resin 1 09/09/2004 08/12/2005 12/08/2010 390461 2416 2.28% 0.0002%
25 EUN-AD-605 2006-L23-1 Tartaric Acid 1 10/30/2004 01/27/2006 291812 2414 9.50% 0.0002%
26 EUN-AD-611 2006-L205-1 Lever Arch Mechanisms 1 04/28/2005 07/27/2006 830510 2874 17.20% 0.0007%
27 EUN-AD-615 2006-L251-1 Chamois Leather 1 06/25/2005 09/14/2006 411410 1910 2.69% 0.0000%
28 EUN-AD-619 2006-L270-4 Certain Plastic Sacks and Bags 2 06/30/2005 09/29/2006 07/13/2012 392329 2522 6.11% 0.0018%
29 EUN-AD-622 2006-L275-1 Certain Footwear with Uppers of Leather 7 07/07/2005 10/06/2006 03/16/2011 640359 1930 1.24% 0.0006%
30 EUN-AD-630 2007-L72-1 Certain Tungsten Electrodes 2 12/17/2005 03/13/2007 810199 2745 4.59% 0.0001%
31 EUN-AD-640 2007-L100-1 Frozen Strawberries 1 01/19/2006 04/17/2007 04/17/2012 081110 1532 6.54% 0.0006%
32 EUN-AD-641 2007-L109-12 Ironing Boards 6 02/04/2006 04/26/2007 392490 2524 15.36% 0.0050%
33 EUN-AD-644 2007-L160-1 Certain Saddles 3 04/07/2006 06/21/2007 06/21/2012 871499 3542 9.32% 0.0029%
34 EUN-AD-649 2007-L265-1 Peroxosulphates 2 07/13/2006 10/11/2007 10/12/2012 284290 2412 2.88% 0.0000%
35 EUN-AD-651 2007-L296-1 Dicyandiamide 1 08/17/2006 11/15/2007 02/13/2014 292620 2414 20.00% 0.0002%
36 EUN-AD-652 2007-L317-5 Silico-Manganese 2 09/06/2006 12/05/2007 12/05/2012 720230 2415 12.91% 0.0011%
Note: Data obtained from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2015) for the period 1999 to 2007. Only accepted cases have been considered. GAD ID is the case ID in the Global Antidumping Database. EU OJ
Ref is the reference number of the nal decision in the EU Ocial Journal. PRODUCT provides a brief description of the targeted product. No. HS6 is the number of products at the HS-6 digit level included in
the case. For cases where more than one HS-6 product is involved, we report the code for the product with highest import share from China (SHARE TOT PRODUCT). INITIATION, FINAL and REVOKE are the
respective dates of the decision process. HS6 and NACE correspond to the classication of the product at the HS6 and NACE 4-digit levels. SHARE TOT PRODUCT represents the share of imports from China of
the targeted product over the total import of that product. SHARE TOT IMPORT represents the share of imports from China of the targeted product over the total import of manufacturing products.SHARE TOT
PRODUCT and SHARE TOT IMPORT are based on the Customs Agency data for our sample.
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B Quality of the Matching
Table B1: Probability of AD Treatment: Propensity Score Estimation
Importers Producers Exporters
Import Penetration 4.248** 0.909*** 0.219***
(1.914) (0.152) (0.060)
Industry Employment (Growth) -5.179 0.806*** -1.165***
(4.573) (0.300) (0.104)
Industry Employment -0.0563 0.502*** -0.055***
(0.085) (0.073) (0.014)
Industry Productivity -29.490*** 16.130*** -1.146***
(6.549) (1.300) (0.195)
Chinese Price -0.003*** -0.0003*** -0.111***
(0.0009) (0.00005) (0.010)
GDP EU (Growth) -5.365*** -4.326*** -0.053***
(0.507) (0.227) (0.015)
No. Investigations 0.048* 1.196*** 0.007***
(0.024) (0.056) (0.001)
Firm Size 0.222*** 0.167*** 0.012
(0.078) (0.053) (0.016)
Firm TFP 0.106 0.127 -0.016
(0.139) (0.102) (0.010)
Firm Exporter Dummy 0.181 0.822***
(0.328) (0.113)
Firm Total Imports 0.271*** 0.041*** 0.192***
(0.056) (0.007) (0.008)
Firm Inputs -0.140***
(0.015)
Pseudo R2 0.676 0.7492 0.081
No. Obs. 8,173 14,939 12,941
Note: The estimation model used is a logit with year and industry xed eects.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. In the rst column, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a
French rm has imported one of the aected products from China at the HS
6-digit level during the period of analysis and 0 otherwise. In the second col-
umn, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a French rm belongs to
one of the protected sectors at the NACE 4-digit level and 0 otherwise. In the
third column, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a Chinese ex-
porter has been aected by EU AD measures and 0 otherwise. At the imported
product level we control for lagged import penetration from China dened as
the share of imports from China over total imports of the EU at the HS 6-
digit level, lagged import price from China measured as the ratio of the value
over volume of imports from China into the EU at the HS 6-digit level (both
based on the COMTRADE dataset) and the cumulative number of previous
EU AD investigations from 1987 onward calculated using the GAD database.
All product-level variables are averaged at the level of the rm over the set of
products aecting each rm. At the level of the industry of the product we
control for the lagged employment level of the EU industry at the NACE 4-
digit level, lagged growth rate of employment and lagged level of productivity
measured as value added per employee. We also control for the lagged level
of GDP growth in the EU. All product-industry variables are extracted from
the Structural Business Statistics database of EUROSTAT and are measured
at the EU level for each NACE 4-digit industry. At the rm level, we include
lagged size measured by the number of employees, lagged TFP, lagged value
of total imports and an exporter dummy. In the sample of Chinese exporters
we replace the exporter dummy with a variable measuring the lagged value of
intermediate inputs. All rm level variables are based on the French Annual
Business Survey and the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms.
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Table B2: Matching Balancing Test for Import-Dependent Firms
Treated Control %bias t-test V(T)/V(C)
Import Penetration 0.008 0.006 4.4 0.95 1.06
Industry Employment (Growth) 0.0007 0.0006 0.4 0.16 0.97
Industry Employment 8.753 8.818 5.3 1.06 0.93
Industry Productivity 0.008 0.010 8.5 2.6 1.23
Chinese Price 24.609 61.844 0.4 0.27 1
No. Investigations 0.806 1.195 16.7 2.62 0.96
GDP EU (Growth) 2.303 2.241 12.3 2.32 1.08
Firm Size 4.873 4.975 8.9 1.42 0.83
Firm TFP 4.932 4.921 1.6 0.27 1.07
Firm Exporter Dummy 0.973 0.976 1 0.34 .
Firm Total Imports 15.275 15.190 3.3 0.86 0.9
Note: Columns 2 and 3 present the mean value of each control variable for rms in the treated and control groups
after the implementation of the matching technique. Column 4 displays the median standard bias across all the
covariates included in the logit model after the application of the matching procedure. Column 5 reports the t-tests
for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample compared with those in the unmatched
sample. Column 6 shows the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to the linear index of the propensity score in
the treated group over the non-treated group.
Table B3: Matching Balancing Test for Import-Competing Firms
Treated Control %bias t-test V(T)/V(C)
Import Penetration 0.273 0.175 16.2 2.71 0.92
Industry Employment (Growth) 0.093 0.075 10.4 3.45 1.1
Industry Employment 12.569 12.153 25.8 2.57 0.8
Industry Productivity 0.155 0.151 6.6 1.65 0.93
Chinese Price 1314.2 1633.5 4.7 1.48 0.91
No. Investigations 1.759 1.827 9.6 2.02 1.09
GDP EU (Growth) 2.389 2.339 6.6 1.32 1.04
Firm Size 4.163 4.129 3.5 1.18 0.99
Firm TFP 4.463 4.515 8.9 1.67 0.93
Firm Exporter Dummy 0.865 0.777 21.3 3.36 .
Firm Total Imports 9.357 9.332 0.4 0.14 1
Note: Columns 2 and 3 present the mean value of each control variable for rms in the treated and control groups
after the implementation of the matching technique. Column 4 displays the median standard bias across all the
covariates included in the logit model after the application of the matching procedure. Column 5 reports the t-tests
for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample compared with those in the unmatched
sample. Column 6 shows the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to the linear index of the propensity score in
the treated group over the non-treated group.
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Table B4: Matching Balancing Test for Chinese Exporters
Treated Control %bias t-test V(T)/V(C)
Import Penetration 0.250 0.253 -1.6 -1.03 0.92
Industry Employment (Growth) 0.013 0.012 1.3 1.07 1.27
Industry Employment 11.849 11.859 -1.0 -0.68 1.33
Industry Productivity 0.148 0.141 9.2 7.03 0.71
Chinese Price 1.609 1.599 0.8 0.66 1.01
No. Investigations 8.154 6.725 7.5 4.31 1.31
GDP EU (Growth) 2.383 2.383 -0.0 -0.02 1.36
Firm Size 5.763 5.716 5.716 2.69 1.05
Firm TFP 6.355 6.330 1.6 1.13 0.85
Firm Inputs 10.689 10.622 5.2 3.49 0.88
Firm Total Imports 12.243 12.179 3.1 2.23 1.19
Note: Columns 2 and 3 present the mean value of each control variable for rms in the treated and control groups
after the implementation of the matching technique. Column 4 displays the median standard bias across all the
covariates included in the logit model after the application of the matching procedure. Column 5 reports the t-tests
for the equality of the mean values of observations in the matched sample compared with those in the unmatched
sample. Column 6 shows the ratio of variance of residuals orthogonal to the linear index of the propensity score in
the treated group over the non-treated group.
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C Additional Results and Robustness Checks
Table C1: Impact of EU AD Measures on Chinese Exports of Targeted Products
Product-Level Analysis
Export Volume No of Exporters
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
ATT -0.475*** -0.599*** -0.954*** -0.175*** -0.200** -0.392***
s.e. (0.179) (0.251) (0.284) (0.089) (0.083) (0.123)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Obs. 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Firm-Product-Level Analysis: Surviving Exporters
Export Volume Export Price (FoB)
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
ATT 0.001 -0.082 -0.223 -0.001 -0.047 -0.030
s.e. (0.075) (0.155) (0.154) (0.018) (0.029) (0.087)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Obs. 167,839 167,839 167,839 167,839 167,839 167,839
Note: The estimations are based on the Chinese Customs Data for the period of 2000 to 2006. The ATT eect is
estimated using DID technique. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Following Lu et al. (2013); the treatment group is
the HS 6-digit-level products aected by EU AD measures and the control group is the unaected HS 6-digit-level
products within the same HS 4-digit-level industry as the aected HS 6-digit-level products. The dependent vari-
ables for the product-level analysis are the annual export volumes and the number of exporters at the HS 6-digit
level. The dependent variables for surviving exporters are export volume and export price at the rm-product level.
Standard errors clustered at the product level are reported in parentheses.
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Table C2: Impact of EU AD Measures on the Price of Imported Targeted Products
Price (FoB)
t t+1 t+2
China
ATT 0.062*** 0.067** 0.098***
b.s.e. (0.024) (0.033) (0.037)
Intra-EU
ATT 0.016 0.054 -0.029
b.s.e. (0.043) (0.047) (0.083)
Rest of the World
ATT 0.128*** 0.164*** 0.137*
b.s.e. (0.033) (0.054) (0.077)
No. Obs. 24,245 24,245 24,245
Note: The estimations are based on Eurostat COMEXT
import data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is es-
timated using a DID technique with propensity score kernel
matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.)
with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of products included in the
sample is reported. The dependent variables are the growth of
the annual import prices from China to the EU, for intra-EU
trade, and for imports from the rest of the world excluding
China for targeted products at the HS 6-digit level in the
following three years after the imposition of AD measures.
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Table C3: Heterogeneity of the Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Competing Firms: Analysis by Quartiles of TFP
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.0172 0.062* 0.194** 0.018 0.0065 0.015 -0.045 -0.104** -0.057 -0.146*** -0.061** 0.038
b.s.e. (0.034) (0.039) (0.061) (0.033) (0.040) (0.068) (0.037) (0.044) (0.061) (0.044) (0.030) (0.085)
Total Employment
ATT -0.015 -0.019 0.084** -0.0028 0.015 0.037 -0.054** -0.012 -0.010 -0.029*** -0.068** -0.065
b.s.e. (0.017) (0.025) (0.044) (0.020) (0.027) (0.049) (0.024) (0.034) (0.050) (0.011) (0.028) (0.052)
R&D Investment
ATT -0.163 -0.081 -0.322 0.095 -0.092 -0.019 0.283 0.293 0.142 0.056 -0.210 0.230
b.s.e. (0.191) (0.208) (0.342) (0.178) (0.194) (0.358) (0.187) (0.195) (0.291) (0.142) (0.167) (0.300)
Total Exports
ATT -0.157 -0.277 -0.067 0.025 -0.124 0.204 0.189 -0.184 -0.180 -0.277** -0.0191 0.304
b.s.e. (0.169) (0.203) (0.297) (0.224) (0.263) (0.429) (0.256) (0.293) (0.398) (0.161) (0.247) (0.406)
No. Obs. 3,916 3,879 3,257 3,732 3,699 3,081 3,690 3,656 2,952 3,601 3,513 2,742
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID
technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t− 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports
value. The sample includes import-dependent rms dened as rms in the NACE 4-digit-level industries to which the targeted products protected by EU AD
measures have been matched using the Pierce and Schott (2009) concordance table between HS and SIC codes. The sample is divided into quartiles of TFP in
(t − 1). We match treated rms with similar rms, according to their TFP distribution, operating in other NACE 4-digit industries included within the same
NACE 2-digit industries and that have not been protected by any other EU AD measure.
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Table C4: Heterogeneity of the Impact of EU AD Measures on Chinese Exporters: Analysis by Quartiles of TFP
First Quartile Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.224** 0.050 -0.648 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.016 0.020 0.066 0.150*** 0.188** 0.060
b.s.e (0.104) (0.156) (0.429) (0.010) (0.018) (0.032) (0.012) (0.019) (0.048) (0.036) (0.077) (0.065)
Total Employment
ATT 0.128*** 0.136** 0.245** 0.046 0.212*** 0.076 -0.030 0.211** 0.325*** 0.227*** 0.287*** 0.193
b.s.e (0.034) (0.059) (0.119) (0.04) (0.063) (0.109) (0.048) (0.084) (0.122) (0.069) (0.097) (0.132)
R&D Investment
ATT 0.073 -0.021 0.053 -0.181** -0.240* -0.027 0.058 0.402* -0.817*** 0.202 0.550* -0.341
b.s.e (0.072) (0.152) (0.206) (0.081) (0.131) (0.276) (0.128) (0.225) (0.272) (0.137) (0.314) (0.411)
Total Exports
ATT 0.331*** 0.546*** 0.626* 0.308*** 0.472*** 0.661*** 0.347*** 0.480*** 0.716** 0.626*** 0.910*** 0.431*
b.s.e (0.113) (0.182) (0.325) (0.080) (0.145) (0.174) (0.081) (0.150) (0.268) (0.175) (0.324) (0.221)
No. Obs. 9,051 9,051 9,051 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,179 7,179 7,179 6,578 6,578 6,578
Note: The estimations are based on the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and the Chinese Customs Data between 2000 and 2006. The ATT eect is estimated
using a DID technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. The
sample includes all Chinese rms exporting to the EU the products targeted by EU AD measures in (t − 1). The sample is divided into quartiles of TFP in (t − 1). We
match treated rms with similar exporters, according to their TFP distribution, within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
46
Table C5: Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Dependent Firms: Robustness Checks
One-to-One Matching Kernel Matching: FE Logit
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.130** -0.077* 0.0006 -0.079*** -0.088*** -0.035
b.s.e. (0.055) (0.043) (0.069) (0.012) (0.015) (0.033)
Total Employment
ATT -0.067*** -0.031* -0.073 -0.015** -0.025*** -0.016
b.s.e. (0.020) (0.026) (0.058) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018)
R&D Investment
ATT -0.279 -0.156 -0.088 -0.122 0.042 0.052
b.s.e. (0.180) (0.184) (0.268) (0.081) (0.092) (0.150)
Total Exports
ATT -0.280*** -0.378*** 0.007 -0.023 -0.039 -0.218**
b.s.e. (0.098) (0.147) (0.377) (0.050) (0.055) (0.105)
No. Obs. 8,175 8,141 7,370 7,998 7,964 7,205
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999
and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID technique using a 1-to-1 nearest-neighbor matching
based on propensity score estimation presented in Table B1 and kernel matching procedure based on a
propensity score estimated using a panel logit with rm xed-eects. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.)
with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables
are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and
exports value. Import-dependent rms are dened as rms importing directly from China the products
targeted by EU AD measures in (t− 1). We match the treated import-dependent rms to similar importers
that do not directly import any products that have been subject to any other EU AD measure at time (t−1)
and restrict the pool of controls to rms that import products within the same HS 4-digit-level classication
as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
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Table C6: Impact of EU AD Measures on Import-Competing Firms: Robustness Checks
One-to-One Matching Kernel Matching: FE Logit
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.032 0.073** 0.077* 0.021** 0.059*** 0.017
b.s.e. (0.046) (0.032) (0.050) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Total Employment
ATT -0.010 -0.0046 0.056*** -0.017*** -0.004 0.023***
b.s.e. (0.020) (0.027) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
R&D Investment
ATT 0.113 -0.023 0.041 -0.068 0.042 0.040
b.s.e. (0.154) (0.132) (0.240) (0.046) (0.052) (0.078)
Total Exports
ATT -0.291 -0.614 0.040 -0.005 -0.0005 0.030
b.s.e. (0.340) (0.484) (0.212) (0.047) (0.056) (0.057)
No. Obs. 14,939 14,747 12,032 14,581 14,389 11,719
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between
1999 and 2007. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID technique using a 1-to-1 nearest-neighbor
matching and kernel matching procedure based on a propensity score estimated using a panel logit with
rm xed-eects. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t− 1), in rm-level
TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. Import-competing rms are
dened as all rms in the NACE 4-digit-level industries to which the targeted products protected by EU
AD measures have been matched using the Pierce and Schott (2009) concordance table between HS and
SIC codes. We match treated rms included in this sample with similar rms operating in other NACE
4-digit industries included within the same NACE 2-digit industries and which have not been protected
by any other EU AD measure.
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Table C7: Impact of EU AD Measures on Chinese Exporters: Robustness Checks
One-to-One Matching Kernel Matching: FE Logit
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT 0.183*** 0.404*** 0.289** 0.273*** 0.476*** 0.353***
b.s.e. (0.043) (0.066) (0.133) (0.042) (0.063) (0.133)
Total Employment
ATT 0.256*** 0.374*** 0.409*** 0.255*** 0.427*** 0.410***
b.s.e. (0.034) (0.055) (0.069) (0.038) (0.057) (0.064)
R&D Investment
ATT 0.202*** 0.322** -0.031 0.210*** 0.563*** 0.071
b.s.e. (0.073) (0.132) (0.153) (0.072) (0.134) (0.150)
Total Exports
ATT 0.742*** 0.941*** 1.139*** 0.736*** 1.070*** 1.178***
b.s.e. (0.064) (0.117) (0.116) (0.080) (0.122) (0.122)
No. Obs. 28,023 28,023 28,023 30,017 30,017 30,017
Note: The estimations are based on the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and the Chinese
Customs Data between 2000 and 2006. The ATT eect is estimated using a DID technique using a 1-to-1
nearest-neighbor matching and kernel matching procedure based on a propensity score estimated using a
panel logit with rm xed-eects. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t− 1),
in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. We dene exporters
as all Chinese rms exporting to the EU the products targeted by EU AD measures in the year before the
treatment (t − 1). We match the treated exporting rms to similar exporters that have not been aected
by any other AD measure at time (t− 1) and we restrict the pool of controls to Chinese rms that export
products within the same HS 4-digit-level classication as the targeted HS 6-digit-level products.
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Table C8: Impact of EU AD Measures on Long-Term Import-Dependent Firms, Import-Competing Firms and Chinese
Exporters
Direct Importers Producers NACE 4-digit Chinese Exporters
t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2 t t+1 t+2
TFP
ATT -0.058** -0.046** -0.082* 0.236*** 0.140*** 0.112 0.264*** 0.409*** 0.341*
b.s.e. (0.026) (0.022) (0.046) (0.033) (0.039) (0.065) (0.054) (0.105) (0.175)
Total Employment
ATT -0.039** -0.036** -0.040 0.009 0.074*** 0.084* 0.263*** 0.474*** 0.536***
b.s.e. (0.017) (0.014) (0.034) (0.016) (0.023) (0.044) (0.047) (0.089) (0.110)
R&D Investment
ATT -0.072 0.004 0.123 0.033 -0.359** -0.258 0.213** 0.547*** 0.284
b.s.e. (0.193) (0.212) (0.277) (0.159) (0.172) (0.314) (0.094) (0.209) (0.255)
Total Exports
ATT -0.272* -0.208* 0.190 0.052 0.052 -0.081 0.720*** 0.962*** 1.188***
b.s.e. (0.143) (0.109) (0.191) (0.189) (0.226) (0.365) (0.093) (0.162) (0.170)
No. Obs. 7,524 7,511 7,006 9,243 9,125 7,779 17,990 17,990 17,990
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007 for Direct Importers and Producers NACE 4-digit
and the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and the Chinese Customs Data between 2000 and 2006 for Chinese Exporters. The ATT eect is estimated using a
DID technique with propensity score kernel matching procedure. Bootstrapped standard errors (b.s.e.) with 500 repetitions are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The outcome variables are the growth, relative to (t − 1), in rm-level TFP, number of full-time employees, R&D investment and exports value. The
sample Direct Importers includes import-dependent rms importing directly from China the products targeted by EU AD measures for at least three years before t.
The sample Producers NACE 4-digit includes all rms included, for at least three years before t, in the NACE 4-digit-level industries to which the targeted products
protected by EU AD measures have been matched using the Pierce and Schott (2009) concordance table between HS and SIC codes. The sample Chinese Exporters
includes rms that export to the EU the targeted products for at least three years before (t).
50
D Aggregate Eects Due to Anti-Dumpimg Policy
In an attempt to assess the aggregate eects of anti-dumping (AD) on the dierent groups of
French rms aected by these measures, we translate the estimated average treatment eects on
the treated (ATTs) into changes in the level of employment and exports compared with the period
before the application of AD duties (t-1). These changes are the dierence in growth compared
with the counterfactual situation where AD duties are not applied (and captured by the growth
rates of matched control groups). More precisely, we multiply the estimated ATTs by the level of
outcome variables at time t-1 to calculate the growth, negative or positive, that is due to the AD
policy.
In Table D1 we assess the eects of the EU AD policy toward Chinese imports on import-
dependent and import-competing French rms in our sample. We only focus on the time periods
for which the estimated ATTs are signicant as reported in Tables 2, 5 and 6. For each sample
of rms and each outcome variable, we measure the average value of that variable at time t-1 at
the rm level, which we multiply by the number of treated rms to obtain an overall value at the
sample level. For example, for the sample of direct importers (rst row of Table D1), the average
size of treated rms at t-1 is 352.08 and the number of treated rms at time t is 692 rms, which
lead to a level of total employment of 243,643 at the sample level at t-1. The estimated ATT
for that sample at time t is -0.021, which translates into a loss of 5,238 jobs compared with the
counterfactual situation without AD measures.
To assess the aggregate net eects for France and the rest of the EU, for import-competing rms,
we use the sample of producers NACE 4-digit and for import-dependent rms, we use the sample of
users NACE 4-digit. These are the widest denitions of import-competing and import-dependent
rms in our analysis and the two sets of rms for which we can collect data on employment and
exports at the level of France and the EU. Therefore, in Table D2 we apply the ATTs estimated in
Tables 5 and 6 for these two samples. For each sample of industries and each outcome variable, we
measure the average value of the that variable at time t-1 at the industry level, which we multiply
by the number of treated industries to obtain an overall value at the sample level.
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Table D1: Eects of AD Measures on Employment and Total Exports
Sample Time Outcome ATT Average Level at t-1 No. of Treated Level at t-1 Eect
(Firm Level) (Sample Level)
Direct Importers t Total Employment -0.021 352.08 692 243,643 -5,238
Direct Importers t+1 Total Employment -0.052 360.29 682 245,717 -12,900
Direct Importers t Total Exports -0.298 44,444,400 692 30,755,524,800 -9,165,146,390
Direct Importers t+1 Total Exports -0.301 44,022,640 682 30,023,440,480 -9,037,055,584
Importers from non-EU t+1 Total Employment -0.042 399.26 1,168 466,335 -19,726
Importers from non-EU t+2 Total Employment -0.068 426.35 856 364,963 -24,926
Importers from non-EU t+1 Total Exports -0.453 44,775,560 1,168 52,297,854,080 -23,690,927,898
Producers Nace 4-digit t+2 Total Employment 0.004 157.44 2,060 324,342 1,381
Producers Nace 4-digit t+2 Total Exports 0.249 15,295,910 2,060 31,509,574,600 7,845,884,075
Exporters to EU t Total Employment 0.112 248.30 872 216,518 24,250
Exporters to EU t+1 Total Employment 0.097 253.59 844 214,029 20,782
Exporters to EU t+2 Total Exports 0.890 33,484,590 506 16,943,202,540 15,079,450,260
Note: The estimations are based on the Annual Business Survey and Customs Agency data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT are extracted from Tables 2, 5, and 6. The impact of AD
measures is estimated as the growth in terms of employment and total exports from the t-1 level compared with the growth that would have occurred in the absence of AD duties.
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Table D2: Aggregate Eects of AD Measures on Employment and Total Exports in France and the EU
Sample Time Outcome ATT Level at t-1 Eect
French Users Nace 4-digit t Total Employment -0.026 3,135,124 -83,394
French Users Nace 4-digit t Total Exports -0.193 283,650,000,000 -54,744,450,000
French Producers Nace 4-digit t+2 Total Employment 0.004 523,316 2,229
French Producers Nace 4-digit t+2 Total Exports 0.249 51,200,000,000 12,748,800,000
EU Users Nace 4-digit t Total Employment -0.026 25,862,484 -687,942
EU Users Nace 4-digit t Total Exports -0.193 828,960,000,000 -159,989,000,000
EU Producers Nace 4-digit t+2 Total Employment 0.004 4,969,130 21,168
EU Producers Nace 4-digit t+2 Total Exports 0.249 178,860,000,000 44,536,140,000
Note: The estimations are based on data from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics and COMEXT dataset data between 1999 and 2007. The ATT are extracted from
Tables 5 and 6. The impact of AD measures is estimated as the growth in terms of employment and total exports from the t-1 level compared with the growth that would
have occurred in the absence of AD duties.
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